It Was Al Sadr Not El Surge?
Yochi Dreazen writes for the WSJ about Lt. Col. Gian Gentile, a history prof who served two tours in Iraq, and who thinks General Petraeus' counterinsurgency tactics are getting too much credit for improving the situation in Iraq:
"We've come up with this false narrative, this incorrect explanation of what is going on in Iraq," he says. "We've come to see counterinsurgency as the solution to every problem and we're losing the ability to wage any other kind of war."Col. Gentile is giving voice to an idea that previously few in the military dared mention: Perhaps the Petraeus doctrine isn't all it's cracked up to be. That's a big controversy within a military that has embraced counterinsurgency tactics as a path to victory in Iraq. The debate, sparked by a short essay written by Col. Gentile titled "Misreading the Surge," has been raging in military circles for months. One close aide to Gen. Petraeus recently took up a spirited defense of his boss.
It's hard to quantify how many people stand in Col. Gentile's corner; his view is certainly a minority one. But increasingly, the Pentagon's top brass are talking in similar terms. Two of the five members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have warned recently that the military's ability to fight another kind of conflict -- say a war with North Korea -- has eroded.
At a February hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, Gen. George Casey, the Army chief of staff, said troops have been unable to train for any other type of conflict because of the short time between deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.
Gen. James Conway, the commandant of the Marine Corps, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that month that the focus on counterinsurgency means the Marines will "have to take extraordinary steps to retain the ability to serve as the nation's shock troops in major combat operations."
Other testimony from military brass as recently as last week has echoed these complaints. Some of the griping is likely geared toward protecting big expenditures on new equipment.
The gist of Col. Gentile's argument is that recent security gains in Iraq were caused by the ceasefire declared last year by Shiite cleric Moqtada al Sadr as well as the U.S. decision to enlist former Sunni militants in the fight against Islamist extremists. Col. Gentile notes that violence spiked after Mr. Sadr's militia briefly resumed fighting last month.
More fundamentally, Col. Gentile, 50 years old, worries that the military's embrace of counterinsurgency -- limiting the use of heavy firepower and having soldiers focus on local governance -- means it isn't prepared to fight a traditional war against potential foes such as Iran or China. He says the more time soldiers spend learning counterinsurgency, the less time they spend practicing combat techniques like fighting alongside tanks and other armored vehicles.
As much as I agree with this general, I wish everybody would stop pretending we're going to war with China. We're NOT going to war with China in any forseeable future. They own all our debt are one of our biggest trading partners and if we went to war every Wal-Mart would go out of business.
The only reason army staffers say we're going to war with China is so the pentagon can get more money to buy super expensive military machines that won't help us one lick in beating Al Queda.
flighty at April 8, 2008 7:49 AM
While I see Flighty's point, It didn't seem to me that anyone in the article was suggesting we were likely to go to war with China. The point as I saw it was that training and tactics were too focused in one area, making our forces unable to fight successfully in other environments (such as big set-piece battles, which are awfully rare these days).
I have no idea who's right, but the military needs to have arguments like this. History is full of examples of armies well-prepared to fight the last war they were in, but totally out of their element when faced with a new conflict. Think of France in 1914, all set up to re-fight the Franco-Prussian war, but not prepared for the realities of the 20th century (not that anyone else was, either). Our forces have faced the same issues throughout history and will continue to do so. Part of the military's job is to predict what future conflicts will be like and plan accordingly. To do that, we need lots of people like Lt Col Gentile -- right or wrong, they need to be listened to.
old rpm daddy at April 8, 2008 9:12 AM
The Careerists in the Pentagon hate Petraus or any other General who has new ideas and is loved by the troops. Its gotten so bad that Bush and the Senate brought Petraus back to head up the General Officers selection board to make sure the innovators and warriors get promoted into the General officers ranks.
As for being able to fight, today's soldiers are about as good as you can get and very heavily armed. A battalion of Marines could annihilate a brigade or a division from any other nation.
Fighting is fighting. Being able to handle a BN or larger fight is really the purview of Colonels and above. Keeping these commands flexible is an issue, but much of the combat muscles such as using arty, air, logistics, comms, and intel wher emost of the friction is - is already in place.
austin at April 8, 2008 9:47 AM
Gentile says winning is a coincidence
So, Gentile argues that counterinsurgency isn't as effective as advertised.
The offered evidence for this is that US success is REALLY coming from:
(1) The ceasefire declared last year by Shiite cleric Moqtada al Sadr
(2) The US decision to enlist former Sunni militants in the fight
And, US policy is REALLY ineffective, because:
(3) Violence increased when Sadr's militia briefly resumed fighting
Instead, the offered idea is
(4) We should be training soldiers to work with tanks and big guns in preparation for the next big war.
Gentile's argument here is that the changes in results in Iraq are a coincidence (!) and not because of the change in US strategy and tactics. This is the same as saying that the military actions in Iraq remained ineffective, but we lucked out.
From what I've heard, the tactic of sitting beside tanks in a few protected bases was ineffective for two years. Gen. Petraeus pointed out that you could not gain the support of a population that you could not protect. He organized defense at the village level and gained the support of the population, who would rather not be subject to either the mercies of Al Qaeda OR the militias.
(1) Sadr gave up because he lost local support, and had to flee to Iran to avoid being identified and captured. (2) Sunni militants switched to support the US because their population could be defended jointly with the US. This required effort by the military to know the people and politics at the village level.
(3) Sadr's militia tried a last gasp and was defeated (but not destroyed) by Iraqi government forces. That is why the Sadr Militia was limited to 'briefly' resuming the fight. Sadr is reported as having lost his political support, even in Iran.
(4) Of course, if you train for counterinsurgency, you aren't running beside tanks, so you are not quite as ready for the next big war. On the other hand, you have a much better chance of winning the conflict that you are actually fighting. Those tanks and big guns are still sitting around somewhere, and I believe that part of the military is still maintaining and basing them.
Andrew Garland at April 8, 2008 10:38 AM
So, Gentile argues that counterinsurgency isn't as effective as advertised.
The offered evidence for this is that US success is REALLY coming from:
(1) The ceasefire declared last year by Shiite cleric Moqtada al Sadr
(2) The US decision to enlist former Sunni militants in the fight
And, US policy is REALLY ineffective, because:
(3) Violence increased when Sadr's militia briefly resumed fighting
Instead, the offered idea is
(4) We should be training soldiers to work with tanks and big guns in preparation for the next big war.
Gentile's argument here is that the changes in results in Iraq are a coincidence (!) and not because of the change in US strategy and tactics. This is the same as saying that the military actions in Iraq remained ineffective, but we lucked out.
From what I've heard, the tactic of sitting beside tanks in a few protected bases was ineffective for two years. Gen. Petraeus pointed out that you could not gain the support of a population that you could not protect. He organized defense at the village level and gained the support of the population, who would rather not be subject to either the mercies of Al Qaeda OR the militias.
(1) Sadr gave up because he lost local support, and had to flee to Iran to avoid being identified and captured. (2) Sunni militants switched to support the US because their population could be defended jointly with the US. This required effort by the military to know the people and politics at the village level.
(3) Sadr's militia tried a last gasp and was defeated (but not destroyed) by Iraqi government forces. That is why the Sadr Militia was limited to 'briefly' resuming the fight. Sadr is reported as having lost his political support, even in Iran.
(4) Of course, if you train for counterinsurgency, you aren't running beside tanks, so you are not quite as ready for the next big war. On the other hand, you have a much better chance of winning the conflict that you are actually fighting. Those tanks and big guns are still sitting around somewhere, and I believe that part of the military is still maintaining and basing them.
Andrew Garland at April 8, 2008 10:38 AM
Read this, somewhat related (via ALD)
http://tinyurl.com/3res4k
Crid at April 8, 2008 3:26 PM
As to the impact of the surge, sorry, he's wrong. I arrived in Baghdad along with my Kurdish friends just before the first US surge troops arrived and I stayed for 110 days before redeploying to the north, so I saw it first hand. The surge - both of US and Iraqi forces and including the practice of pushing them forward into the mahallas (joint security stations) was what forced Sadr to declare a ceasefire in the first place. The additional forces disrupted the functioning of Sadr's militia, weakened him greatly, and forced him first to declare, then to extend, his ceasefire. The surge set the conditions that made this possible.
It also made possible what happened in Basra last week. Maliki is taking a lot of heat for the shortcomings in the operation, but as a former advisor to Iraqi forces, I'll tell you that such criticism misses the point altogether. A little over a year and a half ago when I first arrived as an advisor in Iraq, it took a lot of prodding to get Iraqis to do big operations outside their comfort zone. My Kurds were better, but mostly at the tactical level. At higher echelons they were cautious too. It took a lot of pressure from me and others to make sure the Baghdad deployment occurred and on time. What we saw in Basra recently was the opposite - the Iraqis undertaking a major offensive on there own, with the US not only NOT having to prod them into action but actually trying to slow them down to plan more thoroughly. Believe me, given the choice of these two problems, having to try to restrain an Army chomping at the bit is much better than having to goad them into action. It is the difference between the pathetic South Korean army of 1950 and the tough, hard-bitten South Korean army of today. It is a world of difference.
Contrary to the media consensus, the Basra mission has been a critical turning point and, within Iraqi context, rather a stunning success:
1) Maliki ordered thousands of Iraqi troops into action on as little as 36 hours and they moved, often over long distances, into action.
2) Upon arrival, they fought effectively and forced Sadr's militia to ground. The criticisms of the effectiveness of these forces only makes sense if you apply US standards to the Iraqi forces - and let's face it, very few Armies in the world can meet that standard.
3) Since Sadr called his Basra forces off, Maliki has continued his offensive in Basra, with his forces pushing into other neighborhoods and seizing control of the ports.
4) Maliki did all this with very little US support - one infantry company as extra advisors, some forward air controllers, and some air support. Far, far less support than in any other major operation.
5) The Iraqi Air Force was employed as well as their rotary wing aircraft - another big step.
6) When Sadr's forces tried to counter attack in other areas in response, Iraqi forces withstood and repelled those attacks, often with little or no US support.
Sure, there are lots of ways that the mission fell short BY US STANDARDS. But for the Iraqis, this was by far the largest, most effective, most decisive, and most independent operation the Iraqis have ever launched.
All this is relevant because it was the surge that made it possible. When I was in Baghdad with my Kurdish brothers I used to joke with them that I wished they would raid Sadr City and liberate Maliki's testicles off Moqtada Sadr's desk because I was frustrated that Maliki wasn't doing more against Sadr. The reason that Maliki wasn't doing more was that Maliki wasn't strong enough politically to challenge Sadr directly. But what Basra demonstrated is that Sadr is much, much weaker and that Maliki now feels ready to challenge him directly. Maliki is so confident, in fact, that even after Sadr called his forces in Basra off, Maliki told Sadr that unless Jaysh al Mahdi (Sadr's militia) disarms, Maliki will bar Sadr from participating in October's provincial elections. And Sadr has responded by stating that he may just do so.
The surge made it all possible. By disrupting and weakening Sadr, the surge facilitated the strengthening of Iraqi government and security organizations to the point that they can challenge Sadr directly with success (and do not forget - Iraqi forces are in the lead in the reducing the last major Al Qaida stronghold, which is Mosul in the north).
And Democrat talking points notwithstanding, the surge has facilitated a lot of political reconciliation, including the passage of a budget, a modification of the de-baathification law, a provincial powers act with elections scheduled for October, a new flag, and much progress on other key milestones.
The big problem with the discussion on Iraq right now is that people conflate two really separate questions: Question 1) Should we have invaded in the first place and question 2) Should we be fighting there now. A lot of people who opposed the war act as if the only way they can validate their previous position is by willfully ignoring events on the ground. This is unfortunate. Whether we should have invaded in 2003 or not is, at this point, academic. The fact is that we did, and we now have to deal with the consequences. Petreaus' surge has been an effective strategy for doing just that.
For a good overview of where we are on the much-discussed benchmarks, see this link:
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/933bmtiu.asp?pg=1
One of my biggest concerns is the moral imperative: Having invaded Iraq, what do we owe the people of that country? I think we owe them a viable (not perfect) government mostly free of al Qaida. It is ironic that opponents of the war do not share this feeling, because if we were wrong to invade in 2003, then our moral obligation to Iraq is even greater than it would be if we had been justified: If we wrongfully inflict harm, we have an obligation to make the injured party whole again - or at least as much as possible.
We are having the wrong argument about Iraq. The left wants to make this about whether we should have been there in the first place. I believe that the really pertinent discussion is what we should do now that we are there. To me, leaving the Iraqi people to cope on their own with the mess we made is not a viable or appropriate answer. Helping them establish a new, viable state is - and the greater our error in invading, the greater our moral obligation to help them repair the damage. That's what I think we should do, and the surge has been a very successful method of doing it.
Having said all that, I do believe that COL Gentile has one point - we do need to be careful not to allow our conventional warfighting capability to atrophy due to excessive focus on counterinsurgency. It's a lot easier to adapt solid conventional forces to a counterinsurgency fight than to adapt forces only suited to counterinsurgency back to fighting a conventional war. Counterinsurgency is crucial, but not the only set of skills that we need to maintain.
Dennis at April 8, 2008 6:56 PM
Dennis is dead on the money. I showed up out here in the sandbox at the start of the surge, and I'll be heading out with it as well, and I can say with absolute confidence that the Surge worked as advertised. Oh its not perfect, no factor in unconventional war is...but that doesn't mean it was not a resounding success.
Its true we need to think ahead to the next conflict...but you do not change a tire in the middle of a highway, once we're done out here, we can "pull over to the side" metaphorically speaking, and evaluate how well prepared we are for a major conflict with a dangerous country.
The fact of the matter is though, that there is no major conflict likely with a truly dangerous country in the foreseeable future. China is a major trading partner, Russia is broke, and Europe is dependent upon American military power in the event of an emergency...what, they'll "rise up"?
Frankly it seems like critics are more interested in the march of their careers than of present concerns on how to achieve victory. Its hard to take them seriously.
If they really want to improve the ground troops combat power, they need to pump mass funds into research & development of light weight form fitting full coverage body armor, and environment adapting camo...so that we can fight effectively in either scenario. But what would you bet their "conventional" instead includes purchasing really expensive giant toys with little practical value in the insurgent style warfare we will have to fight in this fractured world of widely scattered minor enemies?
Robert H. Butler at April 8, 2008 10:04 PM
"they really want to improve the ground troops combat power, they need to pump mass funds into research & development of light weight form fitting full coverage body armor"
Amen, brother! Some of our stuff is so heavy that the mobility penalty might outweigh the protective value - in other words, it might hurt more than it helps.
We need two tiers of weight - Soldiers driving vehicles can handle much heavier armor than infantry troopers on patrol. The infantry Soldier needs to be able to shoot, move and communicate - body armor is critically important, but the weight penalty really needs to be balanced against the impediment to free movement.
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