"The Credible Threat Of Arrest"
Paul Romer writes at City Journal how wisely targeted policing really can stop crime:
In When Brute Force Fails, Mark Kleiman describes New York City's successful campaigns against fare-beating on the subways and squeegee men in the streets--a story that City Journal readers know well. The city's experience suggests that concentrated and well-publicized custodial arrests may be a relatively quick way to establish a lasting culture of compliance.Kleiman describes the squeegee men as "something between aggressive beggars and low-grade extortionists." Unprompted, squeegee men would clean the windshields of cars idling at lights and then ask to be paid. For their "customers," this experience ranged from mildly annoying to frightening. Turnstile-jumping--riding the subway without paying the fare--was even more widespread than the squeegee plague. In 1992, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority estimated that nearly 176,000 people evaded subway fares each day. Like public urination, turnstile-jumping and the squeegee racket were illegal but difficult to control, and seemingly trivial compared with more serious crimes.
In both cases, the New York Police Department dramatically reduced violations by publicly announcing its intent to punish offenders and then following through with intensive arrests. In a relatively short period, the combination of public communication and concentrated enforcement created a new, low-violation equilibrium without much need for serious follow-up enforcement. The credible threat of arrest made the squeegee scheme unprofitable--it soon vanished altogether--and reestablished the norm of paying the fare among subway riders. If the conventional economic theory of crime were correct, the behavior would return to its old pattern as soon as formal enforcement relaxed, but this has not occurred. Temporary, high-profile interventions have had a permanent effect.
In dense urban settings, rules are essential for a high quality of life. In most cases, people behave well because formal rules enforced by the state complement informal rules embodied in norms and enforced by decentralized individual action. Because the conventional economic analysis of crime treats norms as external factors beyond our control, it may be missing much of the action on the front lines. Creative enforcement strategies--like those employed in Bogotá, New Delhi, and New York--don't just change behavior. They change norms.
AIRC, they also cleaned up graffiti and spiffied up the place some, too. And I believe that violent crime and murders also went way down in NYC about the same time, which was during the Giuliani administration.
Lots of people think that wasn't a coincidence. The old "broken window" theory.
cpabroker at July 29, 2010 4:41 AM
It would be racist to even think the same might apply to illegal immigration.
MarkD at July 29, 2010 5:41 AM
It isn't the actual risk that stops inappropriate behavior, it is the perception of risk. If you plant an idea that the risk is too high, the requirement for enforcement goes down.
-Julie
JulieW at July 29, 2010 11:12 AM
We have panhandling problems in certain areas of Austin, but no squeegee people. I don't recall ever seeing them in San Antonio, either. Come to think of it, I hadn't seen a squeegee guy in years (in Mexico in the late 90's), until we went to Montreal in September.
ahw at July 29, 2010 11:15 AM
Actually just dawned on me. I travel to NY constantly now. Yeah there are no squeegee mobs, it was horrible back in the 90. I can't believe I hadn't noticed till Romer pointed it out. There was a case in which one of these squeegee guys either got beaten to death or almost did. So I think that got the ball rolling.
The problem with applying it to immigrations is that we'd have to start burning at the stake or public hanging to provide sufficient deterrent. For some the conditions back home are so poor and the opportunities are so high these people have nothing to lose. Even life in prison is better than the lives some of the illegals live at home.
vlad at July 29, 2010 11:52 AM
Amy Alkon
https://www.advicegoddess.com/archives/2010/07/the-credible-th.html#comment-1738236">comment from vladThey were just awful in the third-to-last place I lived there, near Broadway and Houston. They'd come out on Broadway and really bully drivers.
Amy Alkon
at July 29, 2010 12:34 PM
San Francisco will never implement such a strategy against its army of panhandlers. They are too afraid of offending their population of extreme loony left wingers.
Tony at July 29, 2010 6:11 PM
The "broken window" theory is part of it -- if you have respect for yourself and your property and you have to pay for the a-hole that breaks your window -- you are going to be naturally more vigilant.
The other comparison is that the thug is going to worry that you will stick up for yourself, your kin, and your property -- he will look for easier pickings. Ref: Gun Ownership Mandatory In Kennesaw, Georgia --- Crime Rate Plummets -- www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1818862/posts
But if you don't want to believe that -- lets look at the opposite side: The number of murders, theft, and assaults climbed in England after they virtually banned guns. Ref: Gun Control Myths: The Case of England www.capitalismmagazine.com/law/guns/2205-Gun-Control-Myths-The-Case-England.html
And we also quite understand how the murder rates in Chicago when the ownership of guns was virtually banned.
Just throwing out my $0.02. ;-)
Jim P. at July 29, 2010 7:27 PM
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