Wow, whither the TSA apologistas?

I know our government's ineffective, to say the least, but how much more proof do we need that the TSA is a huge money dump before it's disbanded? Is there anyway for the people to get it removed since Congress doesn't seem to be successful?

Wow, whither the TSA apologistas?

I'm not, but I have been mistaken for one a few times.

I happened to read an article in (I think) the WSJ today that the head of the TSA has acknowledged that they are too focused on things instead of people.

"Is there anyway for the people to get it removed since Congress doesn't seem to be successful?"

Yup. I do enjoy saying it. Elect Sarah Palin who has balls and brains, or someone like her.

I happened to read an article in (I think) the WSJ today that the head of the TSA has acknowledged that they are too focused on things instead of people. --Jeff Guinn at March 21, 2013 6:19 PM

Jeff you still have never replied to this:
================================================
The TSA was not needed one hour and one minute after Tower II was hit!

The paradigm, the norm, the expected, what everyone was taught to do was to sit down, shut up and wait for the plane to land and the negotiations happen. That was the model from Entebbe onward.

The passengers on board did not really know what was about to happen on September 11, 2001 at 8:46:30 when Flight 11 struck Tower I.

Even the passengers on Flight 175 probably didn't realize what was about to happen when they struck Tower II at 9:03:02.

The Pentagon crash of Flight 77 at 9:37:46 may have been still a matter of ignorance.

At 10:03:11 on September 11, 2001, United Airlines Flight 93 crashed after the brave souls counter-attacked and caused the hijackers to crash the plane.

The time difference is 60 minutes and 9 seconds from Tower II being struck to the crash of Flight 93. The shoe bomber and panty bomber were taken down by fellow passengers as well. Recently, JetBlue's Flight 191 pilot was taken down by the passengers once he was out of the cockpit. Additionally how many times have you heard of passengers' concerns and diverted flights?

The TSA is and has always been a joke, no make that a total stupidity, that has wasted our country's fortune going down a rabbit hole.

If you don't believe me look at the 9/11 timeline.

There will never be another 9/11 style attack unless the attackers can arrange planes full of geriatrics, and even then it would be doubtful.

Oh, and someone brought bombs being an issue. If bombs were effective and simple then the Lockerbie bombing would have been repeated multiple times between 21 December 1988 and 11 September 2001. That's 4647 days or 13 years. Where was the TSA in that time? There was one successful bombing that was done in Colombia and two unsuccessful attempts in that time. The bombing in Colombia was a drug dealer assassination and not a terrorist attack.
================================================

When you can, please let me know. Until then, you will be considered among the TSA apologistas

"The TSA is and has always been a joke, no make that a total stupidity, that has wasted our country's fortune going down a rabbit hole."

"There will never be another 9/11 style attack unless the attackers can arrange planes full of geriatrics, and even then it would be doubtful."

This, this and has always been this since 9/ll. Except I take exception to even questioning the abilities of geriatrics. Since I are one, and walk with a cane and am half blind, I would still be able to kill the sumbitch with my barehands, little box cutter notwithstanding. If I'm going to die, might as well use all the is left in the tank. Failed at using up all the oil but I tried.

If there's ever another 9/11-style attack, the passengers will bring down the terrorists, not the TSA. Maybe we should be putting passengers on every plane.

Oh, wait...

"I'm not, but I have been mistaken for one a few times."

Mistaken? When you've made claims about TSA function and performance which are clearly wrong? Kidding, right?

The best you can hope for is to be seen learning about risk analysis, since you've stumbled so badly to this point.

Heh. As if. And now, the Saudis are being given a free pass. Yep, that's right, folks! Feel safer now?

From the article linked above:

"The Department of Homeland Security has decided to give “trusted traveler” status to Saudi Arabian travelers. That’s right, the country that we’re told produced 15 of the 19 9/11 hijackers can have its citizens coming to the United States pass fast-tracked through customs without hassle, while the Transportation Security Administration perverts and criminals fondle and/or irradiate U.S. travelers and their infants and children — even those who are wheelchair-bound — and wounded U.S. warriors."

Awesome, ain't it? /sarcasm

Jim P:

Jeff you still have never replied to this:

The heck I haven't.

To reiterate: that gratuitous waste of the earth's precious supply of pixels you insist on posting completely misses the point, and doesn't get any closer through relentless repetition. Clearly, you don't understand the threat, because if you did, you would have long since taken on board that passengers, no matter how brave, don't make the first damn difference to a detonating bomb.

And you would have also taken on board the single most important difference between pre- and post-9/11: suicidal attackers.

So please, for the love of God do not punish us anymore with that rant. It is roughly as useful as yelling about buggy whips in a discussion about cars.

Radwaste:

Mistaken? When you've made claims about TSA function and performance which are clearly wrong? Kidding, right?

The best you can hope for is to be seen learning about risk analysis, since you've stumbled so badly to this point.

In the preceding links you were completely mistaken about cargo and baggage screening, clueless about the concept of deterrence, can't ascertain the difference between intentional acts of war and and unintentional consequences, are ignorant of recent history, and display a touching naivete when it comes to simple math.

Oh, and for risk analysis, you have set yourself up as someone who will undergo considerable indignity when your skin is in the game, but can't be bothered with a momentary inconvenience when it is someone else's. When doing risk analysis, both rate and population are indispensable. Your insistence upon considering airline passengers as the only population clearly shows you aren't capable of thinking this problem through.

Elsewhere I have cited the likelihood that a colonoscopy will stop you dying from colorectal cancer: about 0.8%. Keep in mind that a colonoscopy can only stop you dying if you have cancer in the first place. That means the likelihood of an exam saving your life is far less than 0.8%, because the odds of your having colorectal cancer in the first place aren't all that high.

Here is where rate and population matter.

Assume that the TSA prevented only one bombing in the last 10 years (the evidence is reasonably good that the TSA prevented at least 2).

Now, what about population? Yes, there have been billions of passengers. But only thousands of pilots (about 50,000 at any given time, and the members of that group are remarkably stable. There are probably about 100,000 different major airline pilots over a 10 year period).

Guess what? Do the math, and you will find that the risk of a pilot dying in a bombed airliner is darn close to the chance of your dying of colorectal cancer.

You will undergo a colonoscopy for a tiny chance to save yourself, but won't stand for 3 seconds in a scanner for the same chance of saving someone else.

Nice.

---

Re: effectiveness of scanners.

A couple weeks ago I went through security. Having done this a lot, I'm pretty good at it.

But not perfect.

Upon walking out of the scanner, I got asked rather pointedly if I still had anything in my pockets. Mystified, because I thought I had emptied them, I did a search.

And came up with one of those mini-chapsticks. Right along the outer seam of my pants, which is supposedly where scanners are blind.

So, if you are so bloody certain the TSA is ineffective, try sneaking something that could plausibly be a bomb (obviously using an inert ingredient to stand in for the explosive) big enough to bring down a plane.

Tell us how it turns out.

"In the preceding links you were completely mistaken about cargo and baggage screening, clueless about the concept of deterrence, can't ascertain the difference between intentional acts of war and and unintentional consequences, are ignorant of recent history, and display a touching naivete when it comes to simple math."

Wow, denial is such a powerful thing. You've been shown that dishonesty and gaps exist everywhere in TSA screening, that baggage handlers can be bribed to put whatever you want on the plane, that risk analysis includes intentional acts, and that all of this has been demonstrated in the recent history you are intent on citing.

Just, wow.

Again, for the bleachers: if a determined enemy is actually present and a security leak occurs, then the target gets damaged. The leaks have been shown over and over again.

Pull down your pants, Mr. Guinn. We do not care that you have held security clearances, were or are a pilot or anything else. You, your wife, your children, no matter how small, will all be handled by this unskilled laborer in the cheap uniform because you want to ride on an airplane, and that makes you guilty until proven innocent.

Guess what? Do the math, and you will find that the risk of a pilot dying in a bombed airliner is darn close to the chance of your dying of colorectal cancer. -- Jeff Guinn at March 22, 2013 11:09 PM

So now you are arguing bombs are a huge threat? But at the same time saying the chance of it happening are infinitesimally small. Just like the odds were prior to the TSA and 9/11.

And your mini-chapsticks threat apparently doesn't apply in Newark where they can't find a bomb.

The TSA was never needed.

Oh my! Read this!
Fake Pilot gets passed security.
http://www.hlntv.com/article/2013/03/22/fake-pilot-us-airways-cockpit

[Radwaste:] You've been shown that dishonesty and gaps exist everywhere in TSA screening ...

Never said there weren't. What I did say is you don't understand the concept of deterrence.

Let's say the TSA was 100% perfect at detecting anything that could bring down a plane, and everyone knew it. How many terrorists would try? Now, let's back that off to 95%, or 85%. How many are going to try? The TSA doesn't have to be perfect to be effective, only good enough to deter.

So, by all means, try to sneak a mockup bomb onto a plane. Then tell us how it turns out.

...that baggage handlers can be bribed to put whatever you want on the plane ...

Can they? Really? Anything? How? You demonstrated that you have no idea about luggage and cargo screening, nor checkpoint screening for mechanics (among others).

... that risk analysis includes intentional acts, and that all of this has been demonstrated in the recent history you are intent on citing ...

Now you are shifting the goal posts. I specifically mentioned safety programs, not risk analysis. But never mind that, in what respect does risk analysis for intentional acts within intended consequences resemble intentional acts with unintentional consequences?

The problem you have is that if it is as easy to do these things as you say it is, then we should have been attacked by now. Unless there is no threat from suicidal Islamists.

I'd think even the most superficial risk analysis would quickly reject that theory.

Which must mean it is harder than you think it is.

[Jim P:] So now you are arguing bombs are a huge threat? But at the same time saying the chance of it happening are infinitesimally small.

Ummm, do you mean to suggest a bomb detonating in an airplane is not a threat?

Can't be that. Maybe you are suggesting that there is no one who wants to bomb an airliner, given the opportunity.

I think that requires far more explanation than you are providing.

Because, so far all I can see is magical thinking. After all, when pressed about an alternative, all I hear is [crickets].

And your mini-chapsticks threat apparently doesn't apply in Newark where they can't find a bomb.

So, by all means, try to sneak a mockup bomb onto a plane. Then tell us how it turns out.

[May I say something?:] Fake Pilot gets passed [sic] security.

Some 'splaining is in order.

To get through security, my pilot credentials (company ID and pilot's license) provide the equivalent of a boarding pass. Note, I, and everything I am carrying, is subject to the same screening as everyone else.

When I get to the gate, I check in with the gate agent, who is supposed to check my company ID, as well as make sure I have a pilot's license. Additionally, to ride in the cockpit (if the plane is full in back) the gate agent must verify my identity against CASS (Cockpit Access Security System).

CASS isn't available for foreign pilots, so he wasn't riding on the flight deck in any event.

When boarding the aircraft, jumpseating pilots must introduce themselves to Capt, who then verifies that the jumpseater has a company ID, valid pilot license, and a current medical.

So, from this you can take away that, at most, the fake pilot would have gotten a free flight in back.

Perhaps the gate agent should have caught him out, but that really isn't the TSA's job, so it really isn't a security issue.

"Can they? Really? Anything? How?"

My God, man! Read the damned news!

I don't think you will; you certainly cannot recognize a fallacy, or any sort of logic here.

I'll play your silly game one more time: what makes you think a laptop battery isn't a big enough form-factor to make a big bang? What disassembly or operational checks are required of laptop owners before boarding? What size restrictions on laptops are there?

How many artificial rules and restrictions are you going to insist I observe to attack? That's always fun: people think there are rules, that some sort of fairness is involved.

Darling, the point isn't that one white man might be stopped bringing a bomb on board: the real idea is that the entire nation of radical Islam can be stopped, and IS stopped.

All of them. When gaps are IN THE NEWS.

Here's your fallacy: post hoc, ergo propter hoc. Because there are no bombings, then TSA must be the reason.

Oh, well. I guess I can add IEDs to the long list of things you don't know. I can introduce you to an instructor in IED construction.

Hey, you know what? All I have to show is that anyone brought their spare laptop battery on board, or carried one with a second hard disk or installed battery, to beat your test.

[Radwaste:] what makes you think a laptop battery isn't a big enough form-factor to make a big bang?

It is a big enough form factor, no doubt about it.

However, you must have noticed that bombs require fuzing mechanisms.

Guess what, when they X-ray your laptop (and this is why they make you take it out so they can get a clear shot), that is precisely what they are looking for.

You played, you lost.

"You played, you lost."

Wow. You don't have any idea how laptops are built, do you?

Well, that figures. Can't read the news, can't be consistent w/r/t risk (a JimP point), can't understand risk analysis includes deliberate acts...

Is there any topic in which you consider yourself inexpert?

I'll repeat myself: I can introduce you to an instructor in IED construction.

Just, wow.

Radwaste:

I have a very good idea how laptops are built, I've dis- and re- assembled quite a few.

I also have a pretty darn good idea how bombs are built, as it at one time was my living.

There is more to a bomb than just explosive, it also requires a fuze. For any explosive powerful enough to do the job, stability is an issue. Therefore, any explosive replacing a laptop battery will require a fuze train -- triggering mechanism, power supply, wires, detonator.

Without them, C4 is just a brick.

When your laptop goes through the scanner, they are looking for the fuzing, because without it, there is no bomb.

Looking up thread, I see I am repeating myself. Why? Because your response, such as it was, completely neglected that seemingly important point.

Does your IED instructor know how to build one without a fuze?

can't understand risk analysis includes deliberate acts...

From here:

But as I said before, I have no hope for anyone who doesn't recognize safety analyses cover deliberate acts and completely misses the basics.

I've already covered this. Some safety programs to cover deliberate acts -- read "Blue Threat: Why to Err is Inhuman". But that kind of deliberate act -- e.g., shortcutting standard operating procedures -- has precisely nothing to do with murderous acts.

(Same thread, BTW, where you showed your mathematical naivete.)

There it is, a perfect example of goal shifting.

Please give me an example of a safety program that deals with deliberate acts intended to achieve fatal consequences.

And while you are at it, school me, precisely, on how the risk analysis for safety programs is similar to the risk analysis of terrorist acts.

... can't be consistent w/r/t risk (a JimP point)

Noting that there are different ways of viewing risk -- the denominator for a passenger is at least 6 orders of magnitude larger than for a pilot -- is hardly inconsistent, because both yield completely correct numbers for different populations participating in the same activity.

Doing so, however, does highlight the egocentric soda straw with which you have perpetually viewed risk.

Wow. There really IS no subject in which you consider yourself inexpert.

What the hell do you think a fuse is? Something carried by Wile E. Coyote?

Laptop batteries contain individual cells. One cell is still Li-ion, the others explosive; when the battery is subjected to demand, the switch activates. Maybe - well, at least you'll pretend - you know that laptops differ in construction. Oh, yeah, your TSA official (remember, they're not LEs) knows the difference between something from AlienWare and Apple.

Should the laptop owner carry one with a second hard drive, the externals look identical to a regular drive, and mounting the drive via software is the trigger. The motherboard itself, totally stock, is the fuse in both cases.

A PILOT wants details on risk analysis for deliberate acts? WHY THE FUCK DO YOU THINK YOU HAVE BACKUP SYSTEMS? The damned parachute doesn't care if your engine explosion happened because of a goose or a SAM!

But all this focusing on minutia does nothing whatsoever to eliminate the holes, gaps, chasms through which TSA allows guns, simulated bombs, and drugs, while groping and stealing from the public.
That, to you, is totally impregnable, and the reason no attacks have been successful. Just as with gods, the difference between invisible and nonexistant is impossible to see.

Perhaps the gate agent should have caught him out, but that really isn't the TSA's job, so it really isn't a security issue.

Um, what?
Then who's job was it?
Let me get this straight...
A man, who could have had harmful intentions (because, lets face it, all of this security theatre is based on hypotheticals) was able to make his way past the gate agents, AND this TSA that you tout as 'effective' with FAKE PAPERWORK and you don't perceive that as a "security issue"?
Wow.

I'm pretty sure that sums it up...

[Radwaste: ] Laptop batteries contain individual cells. One cell is still Li-ion, the others explosive; when the battery is subjected to demand, the switch activates.

[face palm] Gosh, that's so obvious; why didn't I think of that? For that matter, I really hope Islamists don't read Amy, because now they know how do decimate our airline industry. Of course, maybe they do know, but Islamists don't exist.

So, I have to admit, you are right on this one.

Unless, of course, carry-on and checked luggage scanners detect">http://www.smithsdetection.com/explosives_detection.php">detect explosives.

You knew that, right?

A PILOT wants details on risk analysis for deliberate acts? WHY THE FUCK DO YOU THINK YOU HAVE BACKUP SYSTEMS? The damned parachute doesn't care if your engine explosion happened because of a goose or a SAM!

Yeah, I want details, not loud typing.

We have backup systems based upon the odds of failure, and the consequences of the failure. Those odds have nothing to do with intentionally induced failures. Nada, zilch, nil. And by failure, they mean material, or from foreseeable hazards (e.g., birds).

But hey, if you don't believe me, why don't you start scanning the FAA aircraft certification specifications. Then show me the risk analysis for deliberate, intentional, actions.

Here's one example. The last major US airline crash was an American Airbus A300 in November 2001.

Cause: the wake vortex from a preceding 747 caused significant roll oscillations. The flying pilot (ex fighter pilot, where using the rudder to roll the airplane is commonplace) countered the roll oscillations with rudder reversals.

That was deliberate, and anyone could do it. However, the certification specs were completely silent on that. Why? Because no one considered the possibility that someone would deliberately move the rudder stop to stop.

The spike overloads separated the horizontal stabilizer from the airplane, which yaw diverged and crashed.

Now all airliner flight manuals contain specific warnings about rudder excursions.

So, wrong, and wrong.

... separated the vertical stabilizer ...

Unless, of course, carry-on and checked luggage scanners detect explosives.

It isn't like the Preview button is missing.

[Sabina: ] Um, what? Then who's job was it? Let me get this straight... A man, who could have had harmful intentions (because, lets face it, all of this security theatre is based on hypotheticals) was able to make his way past the gate agents, AND this TSA that you tout as 'effective' with FAKE PAPERWORK and you don't perceive that as a "security issue"? Wow.

You don't get it (nor does the original post).

The TSA's job is to keep things off airplanes. That guy is no more or less dangerous because he was able to get through screening with fake pilot credentials than if he had a regular boarding pass.

The post has the same problem -- it criticizes the SPOT program as ineffective because its behavioral detection couldn't detect known terrorists.

Sounds bad, until you consider two things. First, these known terrorists weren't in the process of committing suicide, so it is (or should be) hardly a revelation that their actions would be any different than normal.

Behavioral detection frequently catches smugglers who are smuggling, but it rarely catches smugglers who aren't. See the difference?

Second, consider the odds.

That is why the TSA's primary job is to keep dangerous things off airplanes.

" Those odds have nothing to do with intentionally induced failures."

Wow, yet again. An ejection seat, airframe armor, etc., is no defense against enemy action. An engine failure induced by geese is completely different from that caused by the impact of a .50 Browning round.

I've never seen an ego so big. It's like you're channeling Crid.

Wow, yet again. An ejection seat, airframe armor, etc., is no defense against enemy action. An engine failure induced by geese is completely different from that caused by the impact of a .50 Browning round.

On airliners? Wow, I must not have gotten the memo; I really must read my flight manuals more carefully.

Let me get this straight. Checkpoint screening is the response to the risk analysis that has concluded that if we do nothing, then airplanes will get blown up. Yet somehow it is a very bad thing? Right?

To reiterate, since this simple concept seems so difficult for you to take on board. There is no safety program, no system, no design, that is based upon the risk of intentional behavior with the intent of a catastrophic outcome.

And you can't name one.

Oh, and I know I'm at risk of repetition here, but the discussion is about airlines, bombs, and the TSA, not combat aircraft. You knew that, right?

---

BTW, its funny how when I point out how ignorant (about screening, several times now), naive (blindly trusting anything that agrees with your Fort Knox of unexamined ideas), or innumerate (inability to sanity check obviously bogus numbers) you have been, it somehow goes down the memory hole.

So let's review the latest. Do we rely on TSA employees to be aware of how laptops are constructed to detect bombs therein?

A simple yes or no will do.

Sorry I didn't see this earlier.

"Do we rely on TSA employees to be aware of how laptops are constructed to detect bombs therein?"

No, we do not. The details of IED construction are NOT taught.

And safety systems ARE built to deal with the degradation of the airframe in mind. You're just stuck on the cause - as if the plane can tell.

You might visit JACDEC.DE to see how successful deliberate action has been (hint: not a done deal that a plane gets downed by a missile, and zero commerical aircraft have been downed by small arms).

This, too, does nothing whatsoever to eliminate the holes, gaps, chasms through which TSA allows guns, simulated bombs, and drugs, while groping and stealing from the public.
That, to you, is totally impregnable, and the reason no attacks have been successful. Just as with gods, the difference between invisible and nonexistant is impossible to see.